Chapters 6 constrain mechanism in multi - level fiscal system 第6章分級財政制度中的約束機制。
In order to reduce audit risk and improve audit quality , the main measure is to set up an effective incentive and constrain mechanism 為了減少審計風險、提高審計質(zhì)量,最主要的措施是采取有效的激勵和約束機制。
Focus on the inherent constrain mechanism in multi - level , intergovernmental fiscal system , presents an argument that the perfectly des 指出完善的分級財政制度是一種是權(quán)力與義務對稱、激勵與約束兼容的治理結(jié)構(gòu)。
This paper analyzes on the representations of the moral risk of the managers in stock options system , probes into the construction of corresponding strategy from aspects of the performance evaluation system , internal constrained mechanism , and external supervision mechanism , etc 分析了股票期權(quán)制中經(jīng)理人的道德風險表現(xiàn),從業(yè)績評價體系、內(nèi)部約束機制、外部監(jiān)管機制等幾個方面探討了應對策略的構(gòu)建。
If we think establishing modern enterprise institution and developing the big and middle sized state - owned enterprises as the central part of our country ' s economic structure reform , the construction of motivation and constraining mechanisms of manager may be thought as the central part of forming modern enterprise institution 如果說建立現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度、搞好國有大中型企業(yè)是我國經(jīng)濟體制改革的中心環(huán)節(jié),那么經(jīng)營者激勵和約束機制的購建則是建立現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度的中心環(huán)節(jié)。
This part provides the basic model of principal - agency and summarize extend model of principal - agency through introducing the development of agent problem , principal - agency relationship and theory hypothesis and so on . in the chapter three , in which establishes an incentive - constrain mechanism game model . the chapter four , in which analyzes the manager action of state enterprise , rebuilds the incentive - constrain mechanism of manager of state enterprise 本文分為五部分:第一章為緒論,詳細介紹了該學位論文的目的、研究的理論意義及現(xiàn)實意義、研究的方法、研究的思路以及本文的創(chuàng)新之處;第二章為委托?代理理論的概述,該部分主要從代理問題的產(chǎn)生和發(fā)展、委托?代理關系、理論假設前提等幾個方面給出了委托-代理理論的基本框架以及應用于現(xiàn)實中的擴展模型;第三章為建立激勵約束機制數(shù)學博弈模型;第四章為對國企經(jīng)理行為特征進行深層探析,重建國企經(jīng)理激勵監(jiān)督約束機制。
The venture capital has some problems , such as low efficiency , little capital scale , no manager market of venture capital , lacking incentive & constrain mechanism , no smooth withdrawing channel of venture capital . in this article , information economics has been applied to the research of the game between investor and venture capitalist 如投資效率低;資金規(guī)模小,來源渠道狹窄,國有資本占主導地位;風險投資經(jīng)理市場沒有建立起來,缺乏優(yōu)秀的風險投資家;激勵、約束機制相對缺乏,風險投資家報酬機制不合理;風險資本退出途徑不順暢、風險投資的配套法規(guī)、政策不健全等。
This dissertation , firstly , takes the managerial incentive and constraining mechanisms in the listed companies as the research subject . based on defining and clarifying the connotations and extensions of the basic concepts concerned , this dissertation holds that the incentives and constraints are of dialectical unity relationship 論文首先把研究對象定位在上市公司經(jīng)營者的激勵約束機制上,在對選題研究所涉及到的一些基本概念的內(nèi)涵和外延進行界定和說明的基礎上,指出文章所研究的激勵約束是辯證統(tǒng)一的。
This thesis puts forward two ways , which are enterprise self constrain , and government supervise to regulative western consultant market according to present market economy status . the probability of enterprise self constrain based on the maintenance of associate ' s benefit and full - heart service for enterprise . the guild " s perfect serf constrain mechanism assure that it self constrain 在企業(yè)(行業(yè))自西安建筑科技大學碩士論文律的作用研究方面,指出了企業(yè)(行業(yè))自律的可能性建立在維護會員利益,全心全意為企業(yè)服務的基礎上,提出了行業(yè)協(xié)會完善的自律機制是發(fā)揮其自律作用的保證。